
An Agent Identity Is Not Its Principal
Knowing which runtime sent a request does not reveal who authorized it, who benefits, or who is accountable.
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Company updates, technical analysis, and focused field notes on the trust layer for multi-agent systems.

Knowing which runtime sent a request does not reveal who authorized it, who benefits, or who is accountable.

A short-lived user instruction can become durable authority when agents delegate work recursively.

Agents that plan dynamically should not receive every permission their workflow might eventually need.

Cryptographic workload identity helps answer which process is acting, but not whether its plan is legitimate.

An agent with access to several tenants can misuse valid authority when resource and principal context are mixed.

The final API sees a credential, but often loses the human request and delegation history that justified it.

Cancelling a credential is not enough when agents have cached plans, artifacts, and delegated work already in motion.

A signed action can prove origin and integrity without proving informed authority or a fair decision process.

A user approving a final action creates different evidence from a standing intent executed later by agents.